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INTRODUCTION: Giving secondary attention to the proposals and arguments of the western foreign ministers, the Soviet, Satellite, and Soviet-controlled German radios continue to re-
extensively on Vishinsky's speeches at the CFM sessions. Even the considerable number of
commentaries related to the CFM Conference are little more than paraphrases of Vishinsky's
statements, with primary emphasis placed on the expressed Soviet support of German "unity." The
Soviet version of Four-Power control, as proposed by Vishinsky, is identified with the concept
of "unity"--as if it were impossible to have the latter without the former; and, since the
western foreign ministers oppose the Soviet version, they are therefore interpreted as being
opposed to German "unity." As yet there have been no monitored commentaries on Vishinsky's
proposal that the Conference hear representatives of Eastern Germany's Peoples Congress.

GERMAN UNITY AND THE "NATIONAL FRONT": A large portion of Soviet and Soviet-controlled German radio attention to German "unity" appears in commentaries and reports on the recent meetings of the Third German Peoples Congress--which in turn are related to the JFM sessions in Paris. In addition to familiar references to the subject of unity, these commentaries and reports repeat what a Soviet broadcast calls the importance of "the idea of the formation of a National Front, an idea... (which) has opened new paths and found new means for the fight for Germany's unity and the attaining of a just peace." And TÄGLICHE RUNDSCHAU organ of the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin, is reported to have said "that the historic achievement of the Third Peoples Congress was that it rallied not only the democratic-thinking Germans... to fight for national independence, but also the non-democrats and the representatives of the capitalist section of the population." The tactical significance of this "new

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idea" is explained in a DPD* report of a Soviet lecture on "Bolshevik strategy and tactics." On 30 May, a Major Patent of the Soviet Military Administration, speaking in the Berlin House of Soviet Culture, is said to have argued that "organized retreat" when "revolutionary possibilities were waning" forms a part of Bolshevik tactics--and that "the clever exploitation of antagonism in the camp of the imperialists in 1939 had been such an 'organized retreat.'" He is then said to have advised that:

"It was necessary to act according to this recipe in Germany also and to utilize the antagonism within the German bourgeoisie for a revolution. The Peoples Congress, the National Front, and the Nauheim Circle could, for instance, be used at the decisive moment as the vanguard of the proletariat. These serrated ranks must be sent against the most vulnerable point of the enemy. The loss of German national independence to the imperialism of the U.S. was this vulnerable point. It was essential to choose the right moment for the decisive blow. ... The Communists must be patient, for a retreat did not mean that it would be a retreat without fighting."** (Hamburg, DPD, 31 May)

GERMAN UNITY AND THE WESTERN PROPOSALS: In a broadcast KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article

apparently written prior to the submission of the Western proposals, Yuri Zhukov, Soviet correspondent in Paris, charges that "the U.S. is envisaging the unity of Germany merely as a spreading of the Trizonia regime to that of the whole of Germany"--a situation "that would lead only to enlarging the place d'armes of preparations for a new war which is being created in the territory of Western Germany with the solicitous help of American reactionaries."*** Commentaries written subsequent to the western proposals, however, are somewhat less intense in their criticism. A widely distributed commentary by Linetsky, for example, quotes Vishinsky to the effect that the Western document "had been prepared very one-sidedly" and charges that it had been prepared "behind the Soviet Union's back." A commentary by Gorshin cites Vishinsky's 30 May speech as having "once more showed with convincing clarity the difference in principle" between the Western and Soviet proposals "on the question of German unity"; the Soviet proposals are in "perfect harmony" with the Potsdam principles (an ever-present Soviet theme), whereas the Western Powers show no desire to reach agreement with the Soviet Union over the important problem of German unity. Other comments adhere closely to Vishinsky's criticisms of such elements as the occupation statute, the Bonn Constitution, and the majority principle--all of which are presented as being obstacles to German unity.

* British-licensed German press service.

**In this connection, it was reported that "during the discussion when asked about the application of his theories at the Paris Conference, Major Patent said that 'only compromises within limits' which did not 'damage essential interests' would be made. In Paris peace was at stake. It would be necessary to make concessions and it was necessary not to be guided by 'Eastern-Zone patriotism' only."

***Zhukov notes Dewey's presence in Paris and reports that, according to journalistic circles, "Dewey is Dulles' adviser, and through him also adviser to the American delegation at the Foreign Ministers Council."

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RESTRICTEDGERMAN UNITY AND PEOPLES CONGRESS REPRESENTATION AT THE CFM CONFERENCE: As yet, no

monitored comments have been received on the Western refusal of Vishinsky's proposal that representatives of the German Peoples Congress be allowed to appear at the CFM meetings. Reports of the 31 May session, however, have been broadcast; as have reports of the Peoples Congress' attempts to secure representation. The familiar claims that the Peoples Congress represents all of Germany on the issues of unity, an early peace, and troop withdrawal are reiterated. And Pieck, a leader of the German Peoples Council, is quoted to the effect that the Council may be faced with "considerable tasks resulting from the Paris Conference"; for should agreement not be reached, the Council "would have to do its utmost to assert the justified interests and demands of the German people."

POSSIBLE CONFERENCE OUTCOME: Soviet, Satellite, and Soviet-controlled German broadcasts

still hazard few speculations about the possible outcome of the Conference. Criticisms of Western non-cooperation alternate with less frequent suggestions that the Western attitude may change. In any event, says Zhukov, "the immediate future will show whether the representatives of the Western Powers are inclined to take the forward step" called for by the Soviet delegation.

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